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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE
The dilemma of illegitimacy concerns the rights of a person
amidst the competing interests of individuals, the state, and the fed-
eral social welfare system.' The problem is surrounded by the fact
Assistant Professor, The Catholic University of America, School of Law; A.B.,
LaFalle College, 1966; J.D., University of Virginia, 1969; M.Ch.A., Catholic University of
America, 1975. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Marie Sexton
and Larrey Anderson.
1. See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 613, 615 (1971). The common law of England
looked upon a child born out of wedlock as the son of nobody, nulliusflius, and thus he
could not be the heir to anyone, nor could he have heirs other than those of his own body.
His parents had no right to his custody, nor could he assert any right, as against them, to be
supported. He had no name, except by reputation, and at best he was only a child of the
people,filiuspopulus. Moreover, a child born out of wedlock could not be rendered legiti-
mate by any subsequent act of the parents, such as marriage after birth. I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 0459, 465-66. Consistent with the English legal precedent, the early Ameri-
can common law regarded the illegitimate child as having no family-mother or father. See
Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1930) (bastard has no inheritable blood), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931); Houghton v. Dickinson, 82 N.E. 481, 481 (Mass. 1907) (a child
not born in lawful wedlock lacks inheritable blood); Kotzke v. Kotzke's Estate, 171 N.W.
442, 443 (Mich. 1919) (bastards do not inherit); Martin v. Claxton, 274 S.W. 77, 78 (Mo.
1925) (illegitimate daughter treated as if no person existed); Turnmine v. Mayes, 114 S.W.
478, 479 (Tenn. 1908) (bastard may not inherit any estate, real or personal).
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that illegitimate children are not directly included in most inheri-
tance, compensation, or benefit statutes in the statutory defintions of
"dependent," "child," "children," "issue," or "heirs. ' '2 The state, or
the federal government, in the interest of preventing fraudulent
claims, establishes a statutory requirement to prove paternity as a
first step for illegitimate children to qualify for rights derived from
the natural parent-child relationship. Thus, the issue is paternity.
In the recent decision of Mills v. Habluetzel, I the Supreme Court
implies that as technology advances and scientific tests make the de-
termination of biological paternity more certain, the state or govern-
mental interest in avoiding evidentiary problems of false claims, will
cease to justify the use of any facile statutory denials of substantive
rights claimed by illegitimates5 First, in the advent of scientific abil-
ity to prove the fact of paternity,6 unrealistic legal prerequisites or
statutory limitations extinguishing the rights of illegitimates will not
prevail under a constitutional analysis.7 Second, the use of science
implies greater inquiry into all aspects of the rights of illegitimates s
2. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337,
341 (1962). A tangentially related issue involving state court interpretation is determination
of illegitimates' rights under federal law. See id at 340-41. Some federal statutes require
reference to state law definitions of "child" and like terms. See id. at 338; see also Watts v.
Veneman, 476 F.2d 529, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (D.C.'s intestate laws incorporated into social
security laws for purpose of determining eligibility for payments to illegitimates of deceased
wage earner).
3. See, e.g., Veterans Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. § 101 (4) (Supp. V 1981) (illegitimate child
eligible for benefits on father's death if paternity established); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919
(West 1952) (illegitimate's right to inherit from father conditioned upon formal acknowl-
edgement by father); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (illegiti-
mate's right to paternal support conditioned upon establishment of paternity).
4. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). The most recent decision by the United States Supreme Court is
Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983). This decision by a
unanimous Court was a comprehensive endorsement of the principles enunciated in Mills,
especially those of Justice O'Connor. As shall be described later, the Court decided that a
Tennessee two-year limitations period denied certain illegitimate children the equal protec-
tion of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
5. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98 n.4 (1982) (states' interest in preventing
fraudulent claims is protected by advances in blood testing).
6. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1981) (blood tests are highly probative in
proving paternity); Terasaki, Resolution By HL Testing of 1,000 Paternity Cases Not Ex-
cluded By ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 543 (1978) (recent advances in blood testing
predict paternity with high degree of certainty as well as proving "nonpaternity").
7. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92-96 (1982) (Texas one-year statute of limita-
tions unconstitutional).
8. See id at 99 n.5 (entitlement to social security benefits and intestate distribution
frequently involve proof of paternity).
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This paper will thus: (a) discuss the evolution of the constitu-
tional guidelines concerning the rights of illegitimate children prior
to Mills, (b) describe the Texas experience from Gomez to Mills and
the recent Texas inheritance cases; and (c) determine the implica-
tions for the future of Texas law and that of other jurisdictions.
II. HISTORY: THE PRE MILLS EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
The Supreme Court has articulated guildelines with respect to the
rights of illegitimate children in a series of decisions over the last
fifteen years. 9 In 1968, in the landmark case of Levy v. Louisiana, 10
the United States Supreme Court overturned a Louisiana wrongful
death statute denying illegitimate children the right to sue for the
death of their mother." Illegitimate children were identified by the
9. Cf. Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 613, 616-17 (1971) (question of validity of discrimination
against illegitimates not seriously considered until 1968).
10. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Pursuant to a Louisiana wrongful death statute an action was
brought on behalf of five illegitimate children for damages suffered by them for the loss of
their mother. See id at 69. The suit was dismissed by the Louisiana district court and af-
firmed by the court of appeals. See Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. App. 1966). The
court of appeals held that denial to illegitimates of the right to recover was "based on morals
and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the world out of wedlock."
Id at 195.
11. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). Louisiana's wrongful death statute
provided:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair it....
The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi offense is a
property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or
irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
The right to recover all damages caused by an offense or quasi, if the injured person
dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of deceased in favor of : (1)
the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such
child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them,
if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the
deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors
in whose favor this right to action survives may also recover the damages which they
sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover damages
under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the death of the
survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted,
or irregular heirs whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
As used in this article, the words "child", "brother", "sister", "father", and "mother",
include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother by adoption, respectively.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1983).
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Court as "persons" clearly entitled to the equal protection of the law
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 12
Writing for a majority of six, Justice Douglas indicated that when
basic civil rights are involved,13 such as the right to sue for the death
of a parent,14 states cannot deny this right to all children out of wed-
lock. 5 The fact of illegitimacy had no relation to the nature of the
wrong inflicted upon the mother which was the basis for bringing
suit.16 The Court held that to deny such right of action to dependent
children solely because of the illegitimacy of one's birth was invidi-
ous discrimination especially when no action, conduct, or demeanor
of the children were possibly relevant to the harm done to the
mother. 17
12. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). Several lower federal and state
courts adopted this rationale of the Supreme Court and thus, held statutory classifications
based solely on illegitimacy unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ramon v. Califano, 493 F. Supp.
158, 160 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (Texas statue which provided that illegitimate could only inherit
from intestate father if father legitimated child by marrying child's mother unconstitu-
tional); Miller v. Laird, 349 F. Supp. 1034, 1046 (D.D.C. 1972) (exclusion of illegitimate
children of military personnel from coverage under Dependents Medical Care Act unconsti-
tutional); Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737, 740 (Miss. 1977) (no constitutional reason for
limiting illegitimate's right of support to age 16 while legitimate's right was not limited).
13. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 536 (1942) (right to have offspring).
14. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). A cause of action for the wrongful
death of another did not exist at common law. Therefore, this right to recover damages for
wrongful death is dependent upon statutory provisions. See Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik
Stoom v. Maats Holland, 337 S.W.2d 309, 311-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960), a.fd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 344 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. 1961); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4675 (Vernon 1952) (child has right of action for damages arising from wrongful death
of parent).
15. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). The Supreme Court indicated that it
b- been "extremely sensitive" when reviewing violations of basic human rights such as
those involving the "intimate, familial relationship" of parent and child. See id at 7 1. Jus-
tice Douglas apparently reasoned that the right to wrongful death recovery was, also, a basic
civil right. See id at 71.
16. See id at 72. The purpose of the wrongful death statute was "to save [children]
harmless during their minority from the loss of the benefits . . . which they would have
received had their [parents] lived up to the time of their respective majorities." Eichorn v.
New Orleans & C. R., Light & Power Co., 38 So. 526, 530 (La. 1905). The status of illegiti-
macy bore no relation to the purpose of this statute. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968).
17. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). The Supreme Court held that the
Louisiana statute violated the equal protection clause without expressly stating the constitu-
tional standard applied. See Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges The Illegitimate-
19831 ILLEGITIMACY
In a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability In-
surance Company, 8 the Supreme Court held that to deny the
mother of an illegitimate child the right to recover for the child's
wrongful death was also violative of the equal protection clause.' 9
The Court noted that there was "no rational basis" for the assump-
tion that denying recovery to a natural mother for the wrongful
death of her illegitimate child would serve the cause of illegiti-
macy.2" It was "farfetched," the Supreme Court asserted, "to assume
that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compen-
sated in damages at their death."'2 Here again, denial of the right to
sue under state law solely on the fact of illegitimacy was a denial of
equal protection of the law.22
Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee& Liab. Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7
(1969). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Douglas implied that the classification had
no rational relation to the purpose of the wrongful death statute. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 72 (1968). To determine the validity of a statute under the equal protection clause,
various tests have been utilized. However, the Supreme Court requires, at a minimum, that a
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-65 (1957) (statutory purpose must reasonably support the discrimi-
nation); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (regulation constitutional
because rationally related to state objective). Stricter scrutiny is exercised, however, when
statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental rights. See Brown v. Bd. of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
While the language of the Supreme Court was limited to factual situations involving a
mother, the Louisiana Supreme Court on remand interpreted the Levy decision to mean that
when a "parent" openly and publicly recognizes an illegitimate to be "his or her" child, such
an illegitimate is a "child" as expressed in the Louisiana wrongful death statute. See Levy v.
State, 216 So. 2d 818, 820 (La. 1968).
18. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
19. See id at 76. The Giona case presented a reverse fact pattern from Levy. In Glona,
the mother of an illegitimate child sought to recover for the wrongful death of her illegiti-
mate son who was involved in an automobile accident. See id at 73. The original district
court suit was dismissed because under Louisiana law, the mother had no right of action for
the death of her illegitimate child. See id at 74.
20. See id at 75. A requirement of both due process and equal protection is that the
laws serve a rational purpose. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 249
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). At a minimum, a classification must bear some relation-
ship to the state interest. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-65 (1957). The test used in
Glona, however, did subject the Louisiana statute to stricter scrutiny than that called for by
the "rational basis" tests applied after 1937. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53
(1905) (statute under attack needed a direct and immediate bearing on the stated legislative
purpose) with Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536-37 (1949) (Court stated it should not apply strict scrutiny test which would put Congress
and state legislatures into straight jackets).
21. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968).
22. See id at 76. The broad language of the Supreme Court in both Levy and Glona
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Three years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the consti-
tutionality of a state statute regarding illegitimacy.23 In Labine v.
Vincent, 24 Louisiana's intestate succession law was held constitu-
tional. This law conditioned the illegitimate children's right to in-
herit property from their decedent father's estate upon a formal
acknowledgement by the father during his life. 25 Under this statu-
tory scheme, illegitimate children who were never acknowledged by
their father had no right to inherit from his estate.26 Also, Louisi-
ana's statutory scheme required that the illegitimate child be legiti-
mized.27 This apparently limited the general rule of Levy that states
was the beginning of a general change in the legal status of illegitimates. See Annot., 38
A.L.R.3d 613, 616-17 (1971).
23. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 533 (1971). The Louisana state court refused to
permit an acknowledged illegitimate child to inherit from her father's estate under the Loui-
siana law of intestate succession. See id at 534.
24. Id at 539-40. Collateral relatives of the decedent (father) successfully asserted that
they were entitled to the whole estate and that the illegitimate child was barred from sharing
in her father's estate. See id at 534. The relatives relied upon two articles of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870. Article 206 provides: "Illegitimate children, though duly acknowledged,
cannot claim the rights of legitimate children." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 206 (West 1952).
Article 919 provides: "Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father,
who has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor
collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the State." LA. CiV.
CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952).
25. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 534 (1971) (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919
(West 1952)). Acknowledgement is made by a declaration before a notary public and two
witnesses, or it can be made in the registry of birth or baptism. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
203 (West 1952). Not all illegitimate children were capable of being acknowledged. Only if
the illegitimate child's parents were capable of marriage at the time of conception could the
illegitimate child be raised from the status of illegitimacy to that of an acknowledged or
natural child. See i. art. 204 (West 1952). Subsequent to the Labine decision, the Louisiana
legislature repealed article 204. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 204 (West Supp. 1983) (re-
pealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4).
26. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971). The provisions for inheritance in
Louisiana at this time differed from other American jurisdictions (Louisiana is a civil law
jurisdiction) in that it conferred no rights without acknowledgment by the parents. Cf id at
556 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In 1971, Louisiana was, also, the only state that denied illegiti-
mate children the right to inherit equally from their mothers. See id. at 556-57 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Unacknowledged and incestuous adulterous children were excluded from any
right of inheritance. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 920 (West 1952).
Also, acknowledged children are given only limited rights of inheritance. A "natural
child" (illegitimate child who has been acknowledged) inherits from his mother only upon
her not leaving lawful children or descendants. See id. art. 918.
A "natural child" only inherits from his father upon his not leaving any descendants,
ascendants, collateral relations, or surviving wife. See id art. 919.
27. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 546 (1971) (child denied inheritance because
only acknowledged, not "legitimated" by her father). Louisiana's intestate laws provide that
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could not invidiously discriminate against illegitimates as a particu-
lar class of people when such classification touched upon basic civil
rights.28 The Court explained that Levy did not mean that states can
never treat illegitimate children "differently from legitimate off-
spring. ' 29 Labine emphasized the states' power to make rules in or-
der to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to
regulate the disposition of property.30 Levy was further distin-
guished by the Labine Court: in Levy, Louisiana's statute was an
"insurmountable barrier" to the illegitimate child.31 The Court ap-
plied the "rational basis" test in a footnote only, distinguishing the
case from Glona because the facts in Labine involved a sufficient
constitutional basis for the classification.32
The next year in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,
33
the Court returned to its general rule for the substantive rights of
illegitimates: when sensitive and fundamental personal rights are in-
volved, denial of such rights is unconstitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.34 The Weber Court
"children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 178
(West 1952). An illegitimate child who can be legitimated becomes a "natural child" when
he is acknowledged. See id art. 198. Only those illegitimate children whose parents do not
have legitimate descendants or ascendants and could lawfully have married each other at
the time of the child's conception, or whose parents later marry, can be legitimated. See id
art. 200.
28. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). The Labine Court distinguished
Levy by explaining that under Louisiana's wrongful death statute, the state had created a
statutory tort and permitted a large class of persons who were injured by the tort to recover
damages. Under those circumstances, the Labine Court noted that a state could not totally
exclude a decedent's illegitimate children from recovering. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532, 535-36 (1971). The Court found that under the Labine statute the father could have
acted before his death to circumvent the denial of inheritance rights to the child by having
married the mother. See id at 539.
29. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971).
30. See id at 536. The Court has long afforded broad support for state powers to regu-
late the disposition of property at death. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938).
31. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971).
32. See id at 536 n.6. The Court upheld the combination of state interests in orderly
distribution of property and promotion of legitimate families as a "rational basis" justifica-
tion. Id at 536. In Glona, on the other hand, there was "no rational basis" for denying a
mother the right to recover for the wrongful death of her illegitimate son. See Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74-75 (1968). By implication this case
has been substantially overruled. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
33. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
34. See id at 172 (precedent of Levy v. Louisiana applied). As noted earlier in this
article, this general rule was established by the Supreme Court in 1968. See Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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struck down as unconstitutional the Louisiana workmen's compen-
sation statute 3 that denied equal recovery rights to dependent unac-
knowledged illegitimates.36 It was constitutionally impermissible
discrimination to deny state workmen's compensation benefits in the
state statutory compensation scheme to illegitimates where depen-
dency on the deceased and acknowledgment were prerequisites to
the right to recovery. 3" The majority opinion by Justice Powell dis-
tinguished the constitutionally permissible acknowledgement re-
quirement of Labine.31 The Labine intestacy laws, which barred an
acknowledged illegitimate child from sharing equally with legiti-
mate children in her father's estate, were justified by the substantial
state interest in providing for the stability of land title and in prompt
determination of valid ownership of property left by the dece-
dents.39 In Weber, the state interest in legitimate family relation-
ships was not served by the statute. Also, the inferior classification
of the dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears no significant
relationshi to the recognized purposes of recovery which the work-
men's compensation statutes serve.4° The tests employed by the
35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1232 (West 1964) (established schedule of payment of
workmen's compensation benefits to classifications of dependents). Under section 8, illegiti-
mate children are given the lesser status of "other dependents" and thus, can only recover if
there are insufficient surviving dependents in the other classifications to exhaust the work-
men's compensation benefits. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169
(1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1232 (8) (West 1964).
36. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972). Historically, illegiti-
mate children have been denied death benefits under workmen's compensation laws. See
generally 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 204 (1976) (general discussion of ille-
gitimates' rights to death benefits).
37. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 (1972). "Children" as
defined by Louisiana's workmen's compensation law included "only legitimate children,
stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children, and illegitimate children acknowl-
edged under the provisions of Civil Code articles 203, 204, and 205." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1021(3) (West 1964).
38. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972). In Weber, there
was no substantial state interest in regulating the disposition of a decedent's property. See id
at 170. Also, the deceased in Weber, unlike the deceased in Labine, was statutorily barred
from acknowledging his illegitimacy so that they might qualify for some death benefits. See
id at 171. Unlike article 204 of the Louisiana civil code, the decedent could not acknowl-
edge his illegitimate children because he was incapable of contracting marriage with their
mother at the time of conception. See id at 171 n.9.
39. See Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. App. 1969), aft'd, 401 U.S. 532
(1971).
40. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). The Court
indicated that states frequently have drawn arbitrary lines in workmen's compensation and
wrongful death statutes to facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof. See id at 174.
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Weber Court to determine the validity of state statutes under the
equal protection clause require at a minimum that a statutory classi-
fication bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose.4 When such state statutory classifications approach sensitive
and fundamental personal rights of illegitimates, the Court will ex-
ercise a stricter scrutiny.42 The constitutional test of such classifica-
tions involved a dual inquiry: "What legitimate state interests does
the classification promote? '4 3 "What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?" 44
The Weber Court questioned how the workmen's compensation
statute would promote the state's interest in protecting the legitimate
family unit.45 The state's interest was not served by the compensa-
tion statute.46 The Court applied the Glona rationale: it was far-
fetched to assume that persons will shun illicit relations because
their offspring may not one day reap compensation benefits.47
The opinion noted that the historical status of illegitimacy re-
flected "society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons" outside of
marriage.48 Legal burdens should be related to individual wrongdo-
ing: punishing the illegitmate child who is not responsible for birth
is illogical and unjust.49 Thus, the discriminatory classification in
Weber was not justified by a legitimate state interest and was there-
However, the Court noted that its decision in Weber would not significantly alter the state's
interest in minimizing proof problems. See id at 174.
41. See id at 172. In applying this "rational relationship" test, the Weber Court was
following a long line of precedent. See id at 172. The Weber Court specifically utilized the
"rational relationship" test as set out in Glona." Is there a rational basis for the classification
of illegitimacy? See id. at 173.
42. See id at 172; see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(classifications which encroach on fundamental rights must be "closely scrutinized and care-
fully confined").
43. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
44. d. at 173.
45. See id at 173-74. The state interest in protecting "legitimate family relationships"
may, indeed, be developing into a constitutionally venerable concern. See id at 173.
46. See id at 175.
47. See id at 175; Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75
(1968).
48. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
49. See id at 175. Since no child is responsible for his birth, penalizing the child born
out of wedlock is an ineffectual and unjust means of deterring the parents' conduct. See
Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 8 (1969).
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fore constitutionally impermissible.50
In 1973, the Supreme Court had an opportunity in two per curiam
opinions to clarify its seemingly inconsistent opinions of Labine and
Weber.5' In both decisions, the Court opted to follow the rationale
of Weber, thereby favoring illegitimates.52 The Court held that a
state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children
by denying them the right of paternal support in the Texas case of
Gomez v. Perez." Buttressing its general rule that a state may not
invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying
them substantial benefits,54 the Court held that once a state posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support
from their natural fathers, there is no constitutionally sufficient jus-
tification for denying such an essential right to a child because his
parents were not married.55 Although the Court recognized the
problems of proof of paternity,56 it decided that these problems can-
50. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972). Justice Black-
mun's concurring opinion pointed out that under the facts of the Weber case, the state's
statutory structure operated to deny the father of the illegitimate children the ability to even
acknowledge his illegitimate children for qualification purposes. See id. at 176 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
51. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam).
52. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (illegiti-
mates can recover welfare aid); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (illegitimate can
recover paternal support).
53. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). Mrs. Gomez sued the father of her
illegitimate child for child support. See id. at 535-36. Although the child required support,
the trial court found that no legal obligation arose in the biological father because the child
was illegitimate. See id. at 536.
54. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
55. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). Under the common law and Texas
statutory law, the natural father had a "continuing and primary duty to support" his legiti-
mate children. See Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 243, 6 S.W. 610, 611 (1887); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (each spouse has duty to support minor chil-
dren). This duty of support extended beyond the dissolution of the marriage. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4639c (Vernon 1976).
56. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). The Supreme Court in Pickett v.
Brown took particular notice of the problem of proof of paternity encountered in Gomez
and Mills. See Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2204, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 380
(1983). The Court noted: "Our decisions in Gomez and Mills are particularly relevant to a
determination of the validity of the limitations period at issue in this case." Id at -, 103 S.
Ct. at 2204, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 380. Because Mills was a consideration of the Texas response to
Gomez, certainly Pickett, even though a Tennessee case, is an indication of the Court's atti-
tude to the Texas response following Mills. In other words, is the four year statute recently
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not be made into "an impenetrable barrier that works to shield
otherwise invidious discrimination.
57
In the second opinion, New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill,5 the Court held that a New Jersey "Assistance to Families
of the Working Poor" program, which provided welfare to low in-
come families with natural or adopted children, in practical effect
denied illegitimate children equal protection of the law.5 9 The Court
noted that the benefits extended under such a welfare program are
as "indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate chil-
dren" as to others.6 ° State exclusion of illegitimate children from
sharing equally in such benefits, therefore, was held violative of the
equal protection clause.6
Similarly in 1974, the Supreme Court examined the disability in-
surance benefit provisions of the federal Social Security Act 62 in
Jimenez v. Weinberger .63 Benefit entitlement was restricted under
the Act to those who could inherit their parents' personal property
under the domicile state's intestacy laws.' This classification limited
qualification to illegitimates whose disabled wage-earner parent
contributed to the child's support or lived with the child prior to the
compensatory disability.65 Thus, a subclass of illegitimate children,
born after the onset of the parent wage-earner's disability, was com-
pletely barred from recovery.66 The Jimenez Court found that the
enacted in Texas a sufficient guarantee of equal protection under the guidelines of Pickett?
For reasons that shall be discussed later in this paper, this author does not think the statute
is a sufficient guarantee.
57. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). "For a state to do so is illogical and
unjust." Id at 538.
58. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). The appellants argued that the state classification turned upon
the status of the parents as well as upon the parent-child relationship. See id at 619.
59. See id at 621. The New Jersey statute provided public money to poor households
only if the parents were married. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:13-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(repealed by 1977 N.J. Laws, c. 127, § 8, effective July 1, 1977).
60. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
6 1. See id at 621. Justice Rehnquist dissented stating that he did believe it was rational
that special financial assistance be conditioned upon ceremonial marriage. See id. at 622-23
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The Constitution does not require that special financial assist-
ance designed by the legislature to help poor families be extended to 'communes' as well."
Id at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B) (1976).
63. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
64. See id at 630.
65. See id at 630.
66. See id at 634.
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statutory scheme's blanket and conclusive exclusion of benefits eligi-
bility to a subclass of illegitimate children was not reasonably re-
lated to the legitimate governmental interest in the prevention of
spurious claims.67 Here the illegitimate children fathered before and
after the onset of disability stood on "equal footing, and the poten-
tial for spurious claims was the same as to both. '68 Therefore, to
conclusively deny to the second subclass disability support pay-
ments presumptively available to the first subclass, denies the equal
protection provided in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.69
Subsequently, in 1976, the Supreme Court considered another
provision of the Social Security Act.7° In Mathews v. Lucas,7' the
Court examined the illegitimate child's right to survivor benefits
under the Social Security Act and found its discriminatory classifi-
cation and presumption of dependency scheme to be constitution-
ally permissible.72 Under the Act, a child who is legitimate, or a
child who is entitled to take personal property under state law, is
presumed to have been dependent at the time of his parent's death.73
This presumption of dependency applied to illegitimate children
whenever their parents married, if they had been acknowledged by
67. See id. at 636. A gender-based distinction was again criticized by the Court in 1975.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975). Section 202(g) of the Social Secur-
ity Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976), provided that survivor's benefits, based on a
deceased husband's and father's earnings, accrued to the widow and minor children. How-
ever, benefits based on a deceased wife accrued only to the minor children unless the hus-
band was dependent on her or was receiving one-half of his support from her. Social
Security Act, ch. 531, tit. II, § 202, 49 Stat. 623 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(g) (1976). The Court held the generalization "archaic and overbroad" and unfair to
the wage-earning female. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975). More-
over, the Court discussed the effect on the children of the deceased saying that the gender-
based distinction discriminated among the children "solely on the basis of the sex of the
surviving parent", suggesting that this type of classification is an impermissible discrimina-
tion upon the child. Id. at 651.
68. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974).
69. See id at 637.
70. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497 (1976) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)
(1970)).
71. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
72. See id at 516. In his dissent, Justice Stevens failed to recognize a distinction be-
tween Lucas and Jimenez. See id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens noted that the
requirement that unacknowledged illegtimates prove their dependency bore no substantial
relationship to the fact of dependency. This was the same reasoning the Court utilized to
invalidate the provision in Jimenez. See id at 516-18 (Steven, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 498 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1976)).
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the parents or by court decree, or if a support order had been issued
by the court because of the parent-child relationship.74
Lucas followed the Labine view, reiterating the principle that
statutory classifications are not 'Per se unconstitutional."7 5 The de-
gree of constitutionality "depends upon the character of the discrim-
ination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims. "76 Thus, in
Lucas the Court applied the Weber two pronged constitutionality
test as to the type of governmental interest promoted by the classifi-
cation and as to whether fundamental personal rights were endan-
gered.7 In applying this constitutional test, Justice Blackmun stated
in the majority opinion that the standard of judicial review to be
applied was less than "strictest scrutiny," but not a "toothless"
scrutiny.78
Here the presumptions of the Social Security Act, classifying only
certain recognized illegitimate children as dependents, aided admin-
istrative functions.79 By employing such a classification scheme, the
government was able to avoid the tremendous burden and expense
of a case-by-case dependency determination in the abundance of
cases where the fact of dependency was probable.8 0 The statutory
74. See id at 499. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had promulgated
regulations defining the applicable intestacy laws to be the laws of the State where the wage
earner was domiciled at the time of his death. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1101(a) (1979). Section
404.1101(a) states in pertinent part: "The relationship is determined by 'applicable State
law.' By this is meant the law the courts of the State of the domicile of such insured individ-
ual would apply in deciding who is. . . (a) child. . . of such individual's intestate personal
property. The domicile of such insured individual, if deceased, is determined as of the date
of his death . I... "d ; see also S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1965). For cases
applying this rule, see Allen v. Califano, 452 F. Supp. 205, 216 (D. Md. 1978); Massey v.
Weinberger, 397 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Md. 1975).
75. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1976). The Court adhered to its
Labine view that the statutory discrimination between individuals on the basis of their ille-
gitimacy did not "command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess." Id at 506.
76. Id at 504.
77. See id at 504.
78. See id at 510. Strict judicial scrutiny was not required because, in regulating enti-
tlement to survivorship benefits, the statute does not discriminatorily interfere with a consti-
tutionally fundamental interest. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975)
(statutory classifications in area of social welfare such as Social Security benefits do not
require strict scrutiny). The statutory scheme of the Social Security Act considered in Lucas
did not interfere with familial relationships. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 n.8
(1976).
79. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
80. See id at 509.
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classification was not arbitrary and did not broadly discriminate be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children.81 On the contrary, the
presumptions were "carefully tuned to alternative considerations."82
The Lucas majority quoted a Maryland court's assessment of factors
that give rise to the dependency presumption's substantial relation-
ship to the likelihood of actual dependency:
[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legiti-
mate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support.
Likewise. . .the children of an invalid marriage. . . would typically
live in the.wage earner's home or be supported by him. . . .When
an order of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume
compliance occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily order-
ing support, would almost as strongly suggest support was subse-
quently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgement lacks
the imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for
a rational presumption. Men do not customarily affirm in writing their
responsibility for an illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a
man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it sup-
port than one who does not.83
As such, the Lucas Court followed the reasoning of the Maryland
court and held that the Social Security statutory classifications were
justified as reasonable empirical judgments consistent with a design
to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the
time of the parents' death."84
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon85 again re-
viewed the constitutionality of a state intestate succession law classi-
fying legitimate children differently from illegitimate children. Here
children born out of wedlock could only inherit from their mothers
under the Illinois Probate Act while legitimate children could take
property from both parents by the state intestate succession laws.86
81. See id. at 513.
82. Id at 513.
83. Id at 513; see Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (D. Md. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 902 (1974).
84. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
85. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). An illegitimate daughter was excluded from inheriting from
her intestate father under section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 764 (1977).
86. See id. at 764-65. Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act provides in relevant part:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any
person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an
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The purpose of this classification disinheriting illegitimate children
was to promote the state's interest in encouraging family relation-
ships and in the efficient disposition of property at death."7 The
state's secondary interest underlying the classification differentiation
was the prevention of spurious paternity claims.88 In determining
whether the Illinois Probate Act violated the equal protection
clause, the Supreme Court required more than the minimum show-
ing that the classification of illegitimacy must bear a rational rela-
tionship to the legitimate state objective.8 9 The Illinois statutory
qualification provision bore "only the most attenuated relationship"
to the state's purported goal, the promotion of legitimate families.90
In a case such as this involving basic rights of illegitimate children,
"the Equal Protection Clause requires more than mere incantation
of a proper State purpose. '"91
The constitutional analysis "depends upon the character of the
discrimination and its relation to legitimate aims."92 Illinois' at-
tempt to promote the family unit by imposing sanctions upon illegit-
imate children is not only ineffectual, but unjust under our legal
system.93 Legal burdens must be in someway related to the individ-
ual wrongdoers. 94 "Illegitimate children can affect neither their par-
ents' conduct nor their own status."95 The Illinois statute imposed
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which
the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents
inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
1939 Ill. Laws § 12 (current version at Illinois Probate Act of 1976, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 2-2 (1975)). The constitutionality of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act was first consid-
ered by the Illinois Supreme Court when similar cases challenging section 12 were brought
before the Illinois court. See In Re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Ill. 1975).
87. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767-68 & n.12 (1977).
88. See id at 770. It is this interest which seems to be becoming less compelling as a
justification for discrimination in the light of scientific advancement in paternal proof. See
id. at 771 ("problems [of proof cannot be] an impenetrable barrier that works to shield
otherwise invidious discrimination").
89. See id at 767.
90. See id at 768.
91. Id at 769. The promotion of legitimate family relationships seems to be losing
weight as a constitutionally justifiable reason for statutory discrimination against illegitimate
children. See id at 769.
92. Id at 769 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976)).
93. See id at 770.
94. See id at 769-70. The Weber Court employed a similar argument in holding Loui-
siana's workmen's compensation laws unconstitutional. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972).
95. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). Thus, punishing illegitimate children
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discriminatory classifications which denied blameless illegitimate
children the rights of intestate inheritance as an unjust means of
influencing the illicit procreational activities of the citizenry.96
Although lineal relationships were easier to prove with respect to
maternal ancestry, the discriminatory classification of the Illinois
statute favoring legitimate children's claims under their father's es-
tate was not constitutionally justifiable. 97 The Supreme Court, limit-
ing the precedent value of Labine, indicated that reliance on Labine
was not enough. 98 The Illinois court should have further constitu-
tionally analyzed the relationship of the statute's classification to the
state goal of assuming efficient and orderly succession to intestate
property at the decedent's death.99
The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground be-
tween the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determi-
nation of paternity. For at least some significant categories of
illegitimate children of intestate men, inheritance rights can be recog-
nized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the de-
pendability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.lO0
Here the Illinois statutory inheritance scheme was "constitution-
ally flawed" because there were some categories of illegitimates ex-
cluded unnecessarily from intestacy privileges under the statute, but
who could take property from their fathers without upsetting the
efficient disposition of property. 01 As such, the statute was constitu-
tionally flawed in not carefully being "tuned to alternative consider-
ations."'' 0 2 Its discriminatory classification greatly exceeded the
did not further the statute's purported legislative aim of promoting legitimate family rela-
tionships. See id at 768-69.
96. See id at 770. Again the Court suggested that the Labine precedent had been lim-
ited by subsequent decisions asserting that states may not influence actions of adults by
imposing sanctions on illegitimate children. See id at 769.
97. See id at 770-71. Here the Illinois statute completely extinguished the right of ille-
gitimate children to inherit on an equal basis as legitimate children. See id at 771-73. Again
the Court suggested that state problems of proving paternity was of diminishing importance
as a justification. See id at 770-71.
98. See id at 770-71.
99. See id at 770.
100. Id at 770-71. For a discussion of the intermediate level of scrutiny, see Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward" In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: 4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972).
101. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
102. See id at 771-72; Note, he Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudica-
tiotr An Analysis, A Just/lcation, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 995 (1974).
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needs of the purported state purpose.10 3 Paternity suits prove that
the difficulties involved in allowing illegitimates to inherit from
their fathers' estate do not justify the total statutory disinheritance
of illegitimate children whose fathers died intestate. "The reach of
the statute extend[ed] well beyond the asserted purposes."'"
The 1977 Trimble decision substantially overruled the Labine
case which was based upon deference to the state's power to regulate
property distributions after the death of a citizen. 05 The new em-
phasis of the Supreme Court, as evidenced in Trimble, accorded
greater deference to the unconstitutional infringement of the prop-
erty rights of illegitimate children than to the state's statutory
scheme of inheritance."° The Trimble Court demonstrated a greater
sensitivity to the irrationality and injustice of state imposition of le-
gal burdens upon illegitimate children to pressure potential parents,
men and women engaging in "irresponsible" sexual relationships, to
conform their conduct to societal norms.1
07
In 1978, the year following Trimble, the Supreme Court in Lalli v.
Lalli'0 judged the constitutionality of a New York intestate succes-
sion statute requiring illegitimate children to obtain a judicial order
of affiliation declaring paternity from a court of competent jurisdic-
tion during the father's lifetime, as a prerequisite for inheritance in
their father's estate. Illegitimate children had to prove paternity in a
court proceeding before they could qualify as heirs of the father;
failure to secure such evidence during the father's lifetime disquali-
fied them to share in the intestate estate of the father at his death.m°9
103. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977).
104. Id at 772-73.
105. Cf. id at 767 n. 12 (Court noted that "there is a point beyond which such deference
cannot justify discrimination").
106. See id at 771. The state must not only be concerned with disposition of its de-
ceased citizen's property, but must also take care not to infringe on a constitutional right. See
id at 771. In scrutinizing a challenged statute, the Court will defer to a state's responsiblity
to dispose of such property, but it will also balance the constitutional rights of persons af-
fected by the statute. See id at 771.
107. See id at 768-70.
108. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
109. See id at 262. The New York statute provided in pertinent part:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit
from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father,
made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the
pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). Subsequent to the Lalli deci-
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This legal proceeding could be brought by the illegtimate child, the
child's mother, or the father during his lifetime. "' The narrow ques-
tion here was whether the procedural demands placed upon illegiti-
mate children under the New York statute bore an "evident and
substantial relation to the particular state interests [which] the stat-
ute was designed to serve.""'I At the onset of its opinion, the Lalli
Court distinguished the New York statutory scheme from the Trim-
ble intestate inheritance classification scheme in Illinois." t2 The
Trimble statutory requirement necessitated not only the father's ac-
knowledgement of -paternity but also legitimation of the parents
through marriage as an absolute condition to inherit. 1 3 Even court
proof of paternity, under the Trimble facts, was insufficient to allow
inheritance. The precondition that parents marry before a child
could inherit was an arbitrary and unreasonable means of promot-
ing legitimate family relationships by penalizing the property rights
of illegitimate children.'
Under the Lalli facts, in contrast, there was no absolute statutory
bar to illegitimate children from paternal inheritance." 5 The par-
ent's marital status was irrelevant. There was, however, one statu-
tory obstacle, the legal declaration of paternity, which had to be met
in order for an illegitimate child to qualify as an heir of his or her
sion, this statute has been amended twice. See 1979 N.Y. Laws ch. 139, § 1; 1981 N.Y. Laws
ch. 67, § 2; id. ch. 75, §§ 1, 2.
110. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261-62 n.2 (1978); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
111. See Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978). The Supreme Court's 1978 decision in
Lali was not the first time that case had been considered by the Court. When Lalli was
originally brought before the Court, Trimble had just been decided. As a result, the judg-
ment of the court of appeals was vacated for reconsideration in light of Trimble. See Lalli v.
Lalli, 431 U.S. 911 (1977).
112. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1978). The New York Court of Appeals
reconciled Lalli with Trimble by noting that Lalli did not violate Trimble's requirement that
the statutes could not punish illegitimates for the "sins" of their parents. See In re Lalli, 371
N.E.2d 481, 482, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 761, 763 (1977). "There is nothing . . . to suggest that the
[New York] statute was intended as a moral, ethical or social disparagement of illegitimacy
or was the product of proponents whose objective, even in small part, was to discourage
illegitimacy, to hold human conduct or to set societal norms." Id at 483, 400 N.Y.S. 2d at
764.
113. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266 (1978); 1939 ILL. LAWS § 12 (current version at
Illinois Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1975)).
114. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (statute constitutionally unac-
ceptable because effected total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children who were not
legitimated by subsequent marriage of parents).
115. See Lalm v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 273 (1978).
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father.116 In deciding whether the New York statutory obstacle
"squared with the Equal Protection Clause" of the Constitution, the
Lalli Court examined the state's justification for the classification
and its relationship to the primary state goal that the statute was
designed to serve, the promotion of "the just and orderly disposition
of property at death."
'' 1 7
Here, the state interest in the orderly disposition of property was
of considerable magnitude. 1 8 This interest was directly implicated
in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children because of peculiar
problems of proof involved.1 9 The Court recognized the frequent
difficulties in the proof of paternity when the father takes no part in
the formal family unit.
The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a
child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because
of the absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed the mother may not
know who is responsible for her pregnancy.' 2 °
Citing a report by the Temporary State Commission on the Mod-
ernization Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, the
Lalli majority noted that the New York procedural scheme was nec-
essary in order to mitigate the serious problems in the administra-
tion of estates. Some of the practical difficulties were cited:
An illegitimate, if made an unconditional distributee in intestacy,
must be served with process in the estate of his parent or if he is a
distributee in the estate of the kindred of a parent. . . .And, in pro-
bating the will of his parent (though not named a beneficiary) or in
probating the will of any person who makes a class disposition to 'is-
sue' of such parent, the illegitimate must be served with process ....
How does one cite and serve an illegitimate of whose existence neither
116. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). The Lalli Court
noted, however, that this is not a "requirement that inevitably disqualifies an unnecessarily
large number of children born out of wedlock." Lai v. LaUi, 439 U.S. 259, 273 (1978).
117. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978). The primary state goal for the statute
was the promotion of "just and orderly disposition of property at death." See id at 268.
118. See id at 268. Without offending the equal protection clause, a state could require
an illegitimate to obtain a judicial determination of paternity during his father's lifetime
before he was allowed inheritance from his father. See id at 274-75 n. 11.
119. See id at 269.
120. Id at 269 (quoting In re Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1969)). It is submitted that
with the advance of scientific technology, biological parenthood is becoming more of a cer-
tainty. Even those problems of the unknown father are in the future going to be resolved
easily in the laboratory.
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family nor personal representative may be aware? And of greatest
concern, how [to] achieve finality of decree in any estate when there
always exists the possibility however remote of a secret illegitimate
lurking in the buried past of a parent or an ancestor of a class of
beneficiaries? Finality in decree is essential in the Surogates' Courts
since title to real property passes under such decree. Our procedural
statutes and the Due Process Clause mandate notice and opportunity
to be heard to all necessary parties. Given the right to intestate succes-
sion, all illegitimates must be served with process. This would be no
real problem with respect to those few estates where there are 'known'
illegitimates. But it presents an almost insuperable burden as regards
'unknown' illegitimates. The point made in the [Bennett] commission
discussions was that instead of affecting only a few estates, procedural
problems would be created for many-some members suggested a
majority-of estates. 2 '
Spurious claims, also, are difficult to expose because of the particu-
lar problems of proof facing the estate where an individual claiming
to be the illegitimate child of a deceased man identifies himself.'22
Having determined that the state's interests were substantial, the
Court then considered the statutory requirement's relationship to
the important state interests it was intended to promote. 23 The
Commission's report indicated that the law had been designed to
insure accurate proceedings for the resolution of paternity claims. 2 '
The La/li Court found that the New York statutory requirement of a
judicial finding of paternity facilitated the administration of estates,
minimized the possiblity of delay and uncertainty, and made fraud-
ulent claims of paternity less likely to succeed. 25 Although the stat-
ute barred illegitimate children's inheritance where there was
insufficient evidence of paternity during the father's lifetime, this
did not disqualify an unnetessarily large number of children. 26 The
La/li statutory classification was unlike the unconstitutional statu-
tory classification in Trimble, the La/li scheme did not effect a total
disinheritance of illegitimate children who were not legitimated by
121. Id at 270 (quoting In re Flemm, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575-76 (Sur. Ct. 1975)).
122. See id at 271.
123. See id at 271.
124. See id at 271.
125. See id at 274.
126. See id at 273. The Court did not specifically address the arbitrary two-year limita-
tions date under the New York statute whereby a suit could be brought on the child's behalf
after the father died.
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their parents' subsequent marriage.I27 As such the La/li Court found
that the New York statutory requirement was not violative of the
equal protection clause.' 28 The statutory classification was substan-
tially related to the important state interests it was intended to pro-
mote, granting "illegitimate children in so far as practicable rights of
inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by legitimate children. "129
This phrase would return to haunt the Court in Mills v.
Habluetzel. 30
This phrase was also significant in Pickett v. Brown. 131 In Pickett,
the Court condemned the Tennessee two-year statute of limitations
despite the fact that Tennessee does grant to illegitimate children a
right to paternal support 3 2 and provides a mechanism for enforcing
that right.' 33 But because the statute also restricts the right of certain
illegitimate children' 34 and this is not on a par with legitimate chil-
dren, equality is denied. Tennessee attempted to support the ine-
quality with a reference to its interest in "avoiding the litigation of
stale or fraudulent claims."' 3 5 Thus, Tennessee established an ex-
ception136 to the statute of limitations for illegitimate children "who
[are], or [are] liable to become a public charge."'
37
The Supreme Court also viewed this exception in the statute as
demonstrating that the state is not affected by stale claims. If the
127. Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967) (statute in-
volved in Lali which granted a certain category of illegitimate children the right to an in-
heritance) with 1939 Ill. Laws § 12 (current version at Illinois Probate Act of 1975, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1975)) (statute considered in Trimble which recognized only one category
of illegitimates, who were totally barred from taking by intestate succession).
128. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978).
129. See id at 274.
130. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
131. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983).
132. See id at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2206, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 382; TENN. CODE ANNi§ 36-223
(1977) (father responsible for "the necessary support and education of the child").
133. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224(1) (1977) (mother or personal representative may file
petition to establish paternity and to enforce paternal support).
134. See id § 36-224(2) (two-year limitation period for filing petition).
135. See Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. , , 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2207, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 383
(1983).
136. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224(2) (1977).
137. See id; Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2207, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372,
382 (1983). This group of illegitimate children can be represented by the state or by any
person in a paternity or support action at any time prior to the child's eighteenth birthday.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224(2) (1977). This distinction is not justified.
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state can make a factual determination for a public charge up to age
eighteen, then why not for all illegitimates?
The exception in the statute, therefore, seriously undermines the
state's argument that the different treatment accorded legitimate and
illegitimate children is substantially related to the legitimate state in-
terest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims and
compels a conclusion that the two-year limitations period is not sub-
stantially related to a legitimate state interest. 3 '
To further understand Mills and Pickett we must return to Texas
and consider what happened to the Texas statutes in the aftermath
of Gomez.
III. THE TEXAS EXPERIENCE
A. From Gomez to Mills
Prior to the Gomez decision 39 in 1973, the Texas statutory
scheme nowhere provided for "any enforceable duty on the part of
the biological father to support his illegitimate children."'" This
meant that the common law rule (that illegitimate children have no
legal right to support from their father) was controlling in Texas.
l '
In 1969 Gomez filed a petition in Texas district court asking for
support for her minor child from Perez, the man she claimed was
the child's father. 142 At the hearing, the trial judge established that
Perez was the biological father of the child and that the child needed
her father's support.' 43 Nevertheless, the trial judge concluded that
under the common law the father was not legally obligated to sup-
138. Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 384
(1983). The Court's recognized disparity in the Tennessee statute is just one indication that
any state statutory scheme designed to limit suit on behalf of illegitimates to anything less
than eighteen years-and potentially longer in certain instances-will fail judicial scrutiny.
There is thus a precarious nature to Texas' present four year statute.
139. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
140. See id at 536; Comment, The Rights ofAn Illegitimate Child: Post-Gomez v. Pe-
rez: A Legitimate Situation 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 199, 199 (1980) (historically, illegitimate
child denied right of parental support in Texas).
141. See Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. 1965); Lane v.
Philips, 69 Tex. 240, 242, 6 S.W. 610, 611 (1887). Common law, also, precluded illegitimates
from inheriting through intestate succession. See James v. James, 253 S.W. 1112, 1115 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, writ refd); Fritz, Judging the Status of the Illegitimate Child in
Various Western Legal Systems, 23 Loy. L. REv. 1, 25 (1977).
142. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 535-36 (1973).
143. See id at 536.
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port the illegitimate child."' This ruling was affirmed over an equal
protection objection by the Texas court of appeals and the Texas
Supreme Court refused application for a writ of error. 4 5
Ruling that since Texas had created a "judicially enforceable
right" for legitimate children, the Supreme Court held that no "con-
stitutionally sufficient justification" existed for denying that same
right to illegitimate children.'" The Supreme Court's reversal of the
holding by the State of Texas in Gomez was succinct, almost terse.
After a brief review of the rules laid down in Levy and Weber the
Court stated:
Under these decisions, a State may not invidiously discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits ac-
corded children generally. We therefore hold that once a State posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support
from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justifi-
cation for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its
natural father has not married its-mother. For a State to do so is "il-
logical and unjust." [Citation omitted]. We recognize the lurking
problems with respect to proof of paternity. Those problems are not to
be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made into an impen-
etrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious
discrimination. '47
This is, literally, all of the direction that was given to Texas in
Gomez. If an enforceable right is given to a legitimate child it must
also be given to the illegitimate child, the Court said. But how? That
question was left to the state to answer.
The Texas response to Gomez was less than enthusiastic. The
Texas legislature enacted section 13.01 of the Texas Family Code to
provide the illegitimate child an opportunity to obtain paternal sup-
port by establishing paternity. 4 8 The procedure for establishing pa-
ternity is set forth in chapter 13 of the Family Code. 149 Most of these
144. See id at 536.
145. See G- v. P- , 466 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ
ref d n.r.e.) (father had no legal obligations to support illegitimate child).
146. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
147. Id at 538.
148. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon 1975); Texas Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)
(Chapter 13, "legislative 'response' to Gomez").
149. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Chapter 13 oper-
ates with other sections of the Family Code to establish the duty of fathers to support their
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sections, however, only provided the father or mother a method for
the voluntary legitimation of an illegitimate child. 5 ° Thus, section
13.01 was added, in response to Gomez, to provide the illegitimate
child with a procedure for establishing paternity.''
Section 13.01 was a far cry from a liberal grant to the illegitimate
child. The child (usually represented by the child's mother) was
forced to bring an action to prove paternity within one year of the
birth of the child. 52 This one year period was not tolled during mi-
nority.'53 If a petition was not filed within this time limit, the child
was forever barred, under Texas common law, from seeking paren-
tal support from the father.'54 In other words, the Texas response to
Gomez was soupcon.
After the enactment of section 13.01, several Texas courts held
this section (one year statute of limitations) to be a constitutional
response to Gomez.' 55 The constitutionality of section 13.01, how-
ever, was subsequently questioned by the United States Supreme
Court in Mills.' 56 In 1977 Lois Mae Mills gave birth to an illegiti-
illegitimate children. See id § 12.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), § 14.05 (Vernon 1975). Sec-
tion 12.04(3) provides that the duty of support includes food, medical care, shelter, and
education. Id § 12.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), § 14.05 (Vernon 1975). Under section
14.05, the court is empowered to order the father "to make periodic payments or a lump-
sum payment, or both, for the support of the child until he is 18 years of age." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
150. See id § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
151. See id § 13.01 (Vernon 1975).
152. See id § 13.01.
153. See id.; Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189, 191
(Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (one-year statute not tolled during minority).
154. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 95 (1982). This one-year statute of limita-
tions, however, was not retroactive. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Delley, 581
S.W.2d 519, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). Thus, paternity suits of
illegitimate children born prior to the effective date of section 13.01, followed the general
four-year statute of limitations. See id at 521.
155. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (constitutional procedural limit on right of sup-
port); Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (section 13.01 constitutional but not retroactive); Texas Dep't
of Human Resources v. Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46, 50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.) (time limit in section 13.01 constitutional).
156. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92-95 (1982). Prior to the Mills decision, the
one-year period of limitations was amended in 1981. This amendment substituted the "one-




mate child in Texas.' 57 Some nineteen months later, in October of
1978, Mills brought suit against Dan Habluetzel to establish that he
was the natural father of the child." 8 The Texas courts, relying on
two prior decisions rendered by the Texas courts of civil appeals, 59
held: (a) that the one year limitation of section 13.01 was not tolled
during minority; (b) that the section did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause; and, (c) that a legitimate state interest in preventing the
pursuit of stale or fraudulent claims "was rationally related to the
one-year bar and therefore did not deny illegitimate children equal
protection of the law."' 60 Based on this reliance, the trial court as
well as the Texas court of appeals dismissed the claim of Mills and
her child. 161
Partially as a result of the scantiness of the holding of Gomez, the
Supreme Court heard Mills in early 1982.162 The Court was not im-
pressed with the minimal actions taken by Texas since Gomez. 63
Acknowledging that Texas did not have to "adopt procedures for
illegitimates that are coterminous with those accorded legitimate
children," the Court nevertheless held that the approach used by
Texas was "so truncated that few could utilize it effectively."'" The
one-year period of section 13.01 was simply not long enough.
If Gomez and the equal protection principles which underlie it are to
have any meaning, it is clear that the support opportunity provided by
the State to illegitimate children must be more than illusory. The pe-
riod for asserting the right to support must be sufficiently long to per-
mit those who normally have an interest in such children to bring an
action on their behalf despite the difficult personal, family, and
financial circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside
157. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 95 (1982).
158. See id at 95-96. Mills was joined by the Texas Department of Human Resources
which had been assigned the child's support rights. See id at 95.
159. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (one-year statute not tolled during minority, and
does not violate equal protection clause); Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Chapman,
570 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (state interest rationally
related to one-year time limitation).
160. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 96 (1982); Texas Dep't of Human Resources
v. Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 96 (1982).
162. See id at 97.
163. See id at 97 ("impenetrable barrier" found in Gomez removed only to be replaced
with another barrier, section 13.01 time limit).
164. See id at 97.
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of wedlock. 6 '
In analyzing the constitutionality of section 13.01, the Mills Court
reaffirmed its position that any future restrictions placed by the state
"will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are
substantially related to a legitimate state interest."' 66 In effect, the
Court was setting up a two-part test for any future laws regulating
procedures for obtaining support for illegitimate children. 167 First,
the law must give the child a time period which provides a reason-
able opportunity for asserting his or her claim. 168 Second, any limi-
tation by the state of the time allowed must be substantially related
to the state's interest. 69 This interest is defined by the Court as the
"State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims." 1
70
In her important concurring opinion, 17 Justice O'Connor points
out the awkwardness of this test and implies a possible foundation
for a new direction in constitutional interpretation of illegitimacy
statutes. 72 Justice O'Connor demonstrates that the state possibly
has conflicting interests in deciding whether or not to allow a suit for
support of an illegitimate. "The State's interest stems not only from
a desire to see that 'justice is done' [i.e., that no stale or fraudulent
claims are brought], but also from a desire to reduce the number of
165. Id at 97.
166. See id at 99; Lati v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
167. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982).
168. See id at 99.
169. See id at 99-100.
170. Id at 99. This state interest will justify periods of limitation which "are sufficiently
long to present a real threat of loss or diminution of evidence, or an increased vulnerability
to fraudulent claims." Id at 99.
171. The importance of her concurring opinion is demonstrated in the recent opinion of
Pickett. The Court reiterates the suggestions Justice O'Connor made in Mills. These sugges-
tions are:
(1) "[L]onger limitations periods also might be unconstitutional."
(2) States should be more concerned over recent scientific developments in blood
testing.
(3) If the states truly seek to reduce their welfare rolls, the short statute of limitations
should be seen as a restriction on parental support.
(4) "[T]he emotional strain experienced by a mother and her desire to avoid family
or community disapproval 'may continue years after the child is born'."
Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2206, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 382-83 (1983).
These and additional considerations form the gist of the Court's latest pronouncement on
illegitimacy.
172. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls." 173 This second interest,
Justice O'Connor indicates, tends to push the equal protection anal-
ysis of statutory determinations of paternity out of a framework
dominated by time considerations and into the objective arena of
fact, regardless of the time elapsed since birth. Is the child the off-
spring of the father or not? "[Tihe practical obstacles to filing suit
within one year of birth could as easily exist several years after the
birth of the illegitimate child" if, for example, the father had volun-
tarily supported the illegitimate child for the first few years of his or
her life.'74
As Justice O'Connor points out, modern technology' 75 is making
the objective determination of paternity much more exact. 76 Arbi-
trary statutory time limits, she implies in the final paragraph of her
opinion, on the rights of illegitimates to file suit may soon be a thing
of the past. 7 7 The Justice seems to be indicating that the issue of
paternity in the final analysis is one of fact, not of law; and that the
law should recognize this is in order to afford equal protection to the
rights of the illegitimate.
B. Recent Texas Inheritance Decisions
As the constitutionality of the Texas statutory scheme for deter-
mining the support rights of illegitimates was being decided before
173. See id at 103 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. See id at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Once again in the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject of
illegitimacy, the fact of advanced technology and specifically, blood testing, was considered.
See Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 385-86
(1983). In Pickett, the Court went much further than the notice given by Justice O'Connor
in Mills. The Court balanced the technological advancements against any state statute of
limitations:
This [blood testing] is an appropriate consideration in determining whether a period
of limitations governing paternity actions brought on behalf of illegitimate children is
substantially related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at -, .103 S. Ct. at 2209, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 386. Was the Court asking if any statute of
limitations is permissible when technology can provide near certainty long into the future?
This author thinks so.
176. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 104 n.2 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
According to a report by the American Bar Association and the American Medical Associa-
tion, blood tests are over ninety percent accurate in negating a finding of paternity for falsely
accused men. See Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines.-
Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258
(1976).
177. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 106 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the U.S. Supreme Court, the Texas courts were struggling with the
statutory procedure allowing illegitimates to inherit from their fa-
thers. The development of this law in Texas provides an interesting
parallel to the Supreme Court's Gomez and Mills decisions.
In 1976, five years after the death of James Thomas Hinkle, Ru-
pert Bell brought suit in Brazoria County, Texas, against Hinkle's
estate in Bell v. Hinkle. 7 8 Bell sought a partition of the decedent's
real and personal property asserting "a right to one-half of the prop-
erty of the estate as an heir at law of James Thomas Hinkle."'
' 79
Rupert Bell, who was born in Brazoria County in 1921, claimed to
be the illegitimate son of Hinkle.1
80
At trial the jury made a finding of fact that Bell was not the off-
spring of Hinkle.18  Bell, the plaintiff, appealed to the Houston
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in October of 1980 claiming revers-
ible error on the part of counsel for the decedent's estate.8 2 The
defendant, in a cross-point, asserted that Bell could not recover "be-
cause he [had] not proved his cause of action as a matter of law."
1 83
The appellate court agreed with this assertion.1 84 The court of ap-
peals argued that the state had established specific legal require-
ments for establishing paternity and that anyone asserting to be
offspring for the purpose of inheriting under the laws of descent and
distribution would have to adhere to those requirements.8 5 "Since
appellant [Bell] did not bring a paternity suit under the Family
Code, or met any of the other conditions, he [could not] recover
under the statute."' 6 Thus, in Bell, the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals held that the question of whether or not a person was the bio-
178. 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 826 (1981).
179. See id at 937.
180. See id at 937.
181. See id at 937.
182. See id. at 937. Bell alleged that the defense counsel made improper remarks dur-
ing voir dire and closing argument which were racially prejudicial. See id at 937.
183. See id. at 937.
184. See id at 937. Even though the appellate court disapproved of the defense coun-
sel's remarks, the court affirmed the trial court's decision based upon the defendant's cross-
point. See id at 937.
185. See id at 937; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980) (amendment to Probate
Code allowing illegitimates to inherit from fathers if certain requirements met).
186. Bell v. Hinkle, 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1982).
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logical offspring of a male was a question of law.' 8 7 It was to be
decided by determining whether or not the person claiming to be the
offspring had met the statutory requirements set up by the Texas
legislature.
88
Several months after the Houston court's decision in Bell, the
Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals in Johnson v. Mariscal89
tried a new tack in an effort to circumvent the strict interpretation of
the law being applied by Texas appellate courts in paternity suits.
The lower court in Johnson had submitted as a question of fact to
the jury the issue of whether Cesar Javier Mariscal was the natural
child of L.F. Nittler. 9° The jury found that he was.' 9 Mariscal's
mother argued that her son, as a pretermitted heir, was entitled
under section 67(b) of the Texas Probate Code "to inherit from his
father that portion of the estate to which he would be entitled if the
decedent had died intestate."'' 92 The trial court, having established
that the young Mariscal was the son of Nittler, agreed with the
mother's contention and "declared the will [of Nittler] void because
it did not provide for the child."'
' 93
Under the logic of Bell this trial court's decision would have been
overturned. Mariscal, like Bell, had not met the statutory require-
ments for establishing paternity and thus, as a matter of law, had no
standing to challenge the will 194 But the appellate court in Mariscal
wanted to find a way for the young boy to share in his father's es-
tate.' 95 After finding that the existing statutory scheme of paternal
inheritance afforded equal protection to the illegitimate, the court
looked to the definition of "child" in the Probate Code to find a
187. See id at 937.
188. See id at 937; TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980).
189. See Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 907-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1981), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
190. See id at 906-07. At trial, evidence was introduced which described the relation-
ship between Mrs. Mariscal and Mr. Nittler. See id at 906. No blood tests were introduced
nor were any voluntary/involuntary legitimation proceedings undertaken. See id at 906-07.
Also, Nittler never executed a statement of paternity. See id at 906-07.
191. See id at 907.
192. See id at 906 (at the time of his death, Nittler was unmarried and had no chil-
dren); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67(b) (Vernon 1980).
193. See Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1981), wri refd &r.e. per curiam, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982) (illegitimate child born after
will executed).
194. See id at 906-07.
195. See id at 907-08.
1983] ,*107
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
loophole which would allow a factual, as opposed to legal, finding
of paternity. 196 Noting that section 3(b) of the Code expressly ex-
cluded "an unrecognized, illegitimate child of the father," the appel-
late court concluded:
[T]he statute impliedly provides that a 'recognized, illegitimate child
of the father' is included in the definition of a child. Therefore, if a
father does in fact 'recognize' his illegitimate child, then the child is
entitled to inherit. By virtue of this statute, the recognized, illegitimate
child of the father may inherit from that father without other statutory
legitimization. 97
The court further stated that "[rlecognition by the biological father
requires a factual determination."' 198 Since the "trial court failed to
submit to thejury. . . the question of recognition by the father," the
judgment was reversed and remanded.'99 The door was now opened
for a factual determination of paternity.
The following year, a third Texas court of appeals had an oppor-
tunity to address this issue in Batchelor v. Batchelor.200 This ruling,
however, came after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in
Mills. Batchelor points out the reluctance of the courts to move
away from established statutory schemes and into the area of deter-
mining paternity as a question of fact.2 ° It is evident that the courts,
absent a clear ruling from the Supreme Court, are unwilling to ig-
nore or circumvent existing statutory procedure.20 2
The facts in Batchelor are similar to those in Bell and Mariscal.
After the death of James Carroll Batchelor in 1980, Charles E.
Batchelor (James' brother) and Judith Batchelor (James' surviving
wife) filed Applications to Declare Heirship.0 3 James Steven Batch-
196. See id at 908. Section 3(b) of the Probate Code defines "child" as follows:
"'[C]hild' includes an adopted child, whether adopted by any existing or former statutory
procedure or by acts of estoppel, but, unless expressly so stated herein, does not include an
unrecognized, illegitimate child of the father." TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b) (Vernon
1980).
197. Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981),
writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
198. Id. at 909;see Garza v. Cavazos, 148 Tex. 138, 144-45, 221 S.W.2d 549, 553 (1949).
199. See Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1981) (emphasis added), writ refd n.r.e. per curian, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
200. Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ
refd n.r.e.).
201. See id at 72-73.
202. See id. at 73.
203. See id. at 71.
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elor and Lonnie Dale Burrow then filed a Plea of Intervention in an
effort to be declared the sons of the decedent.2° James Carroll
Batchelor, their purported father, died intestate. 2°5 The Probate
Court of Tarrant County subsequently granted summary judgment
for the executors of the estate ruling that, as a matter of law, neither
of the intervenors were the legitimate children of the deceased. 2"
On appeal to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, Batchelor and
Burrow argued that they had been recognized by James Carroll
Batchelor as his children.2 °7 Using a Mariscal type argument they
claimed that "they were entitled to a fact issue to be submitted to a
jury on the question of whether or not appellants were 'recognized'
by Decedent as his children. '2 8 The Batchelor court rejected this
argument.2" Citing Lali, the court held that the Supreme Court
had "left to the states the task of providing an appropriate legal
framework to further the interest of safeguarding the orderly dispo-
sition of property upon death so that the states could avoid a case by
case determination of paternity. ' 2 °10 The Batchelor court pointed out
that the existing statutory scheme in Texas was more liberal than the
New York statute in Lafli.21I The court rejected the logic of Maris-
cal and asserted that the strict reading of the statutes in Bell was the
correct approach.21 2 Therefore, since Burrow and Batchelor had not
followed any of the statutory procedures required to establish pater-
nity, they were not entitled to inherit from the decedent.21 3
The Batchelor decision demonstrates the reluctance of the lower
204. See id at 71 (intervenors alleged they were the natural-born, illegitimate sons of
decedent and thus, should be declared sons of the decedent).
205. See id at 71.
206. See id at 71.
207. See id at 72. Batchelor and Burrow contended that there was ample evidence in
the deposition testimony to show that they were the illegitimate children of James Carroll
Batchelor and that he had recognized them as such. See id at 72.
208. Id at 72; see Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1981), writ refd lr.e. per curiam, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
209. See Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982,
writ refd n.r.e.).
210. Id at 72-73 (citing Laffi v. Lafli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)).
211. See id at 73. The illegitimate child is provided more methods of proof in estab-
lishing paternity under the Texas statutory scheme than under the New York statute. See id
at 73; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 42(b) (Vernon 1980).
212. See Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. See id at 74.
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courts to open new ground in the area of the rights of illegitimates.
Clearly, this hesitancy stems from the failure of the Supreme Court
to provide firm guidance in its rulings in this part of the law. In
some instances the law will stand (Lai, Labine, Mathews), in others
it will not (Trimble, Jimenez, Cahill, Gomez, Weber, Mills, and Pick-
ell). Given the reluctance of state courts to declare their own state's
laws unconstitutional, the failure of the Supreme Court to set exact-
ing standards helps guarantee that decisions like Batchelor will
prevail.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The future of illegitimates' rights will evolve in significant meas-
ure from four factors: the increasing number of illegitimate children
being born each year, the advances that continue to be made in
medical evidence, increasing concern over state welfare budgets,
and a stricter level of scrutiny applied to state statutes limiting "the
personal and fundamental rights" of these children.2 14 The future of
this last factor, judicial review, could result in more courts adopting
a middle level of scrutiny; that is, an approach that would raise the
standard of judicial review in illegitimacy cases to less than the
"strictest scrutiny" applied to all "inherently suspect classifications,"
but more than the "toothless" scrutiny used in cases like Lucas .2 15
As courts review cases in the future, 1 6 the character of the discrimi-
nation and its relation to legitimate state interests shall continue to
214. Through the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment and the fifth
amendment's Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has required that certain governmen-
tal actions satisfy a "compelling state interest," thus immediately subjecting the law to a
higher level of scrutiny. Those governmental actions receiving this "strict scrutiny" usually
involve such characteristics as: immutably highly visible traits, historical disadvantage, or
lack of political representation. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973).
215. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
216. There has been an evolution ofjudicial scrutiny on the part of the Supreme Court.
Since 1968, the Court has been sensitive to many basic rights of illegitimates. See Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92 (1982) (right to paternal support); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 765 (1977) (right of inheritance by intestacy); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516
(1976) (right to survivor benefits under Social Security Act); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628, 634-35 (1974) (right to disability payments upon death of wage-earner father);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (right to welfare pro-
vided to low income familes); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-76
(1972) (right to recover workmen's compensation benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68,
72 (1968) (right to sue for wrongful death of parent).
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evoke scrutiny, but a higher level, a middle approach, would better
articulate constitutional concerns. Nonetheless, the suggestion of a
middle level approach to judicial scrutiny neither guarantees protec-
tion of illegitimates' constitutional rights, nor defines for the courts
or legislature just what type of statute shall pass scrutiny.
As time and cases progress, clearer guidelines and parameters
shall evolve.217 For instance, today at least we can begin with the
constitutional test of Weber: "What legitimate state interest does
the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might
the classification endanger? ' 218 We can ask if the statute broadly
discriminates between legitimates and illegitimates. Is the statute
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations? ' 2 ' 9 Does the statu-
tory language exceed the needs of the purported state interest?
These questions provide today's clearer insight into any definition of
fundamental interests prompting a stricter level of scrutiny.
The cases vary in language and ingredients. For instance, in both
Levy and Glona the Court applied a stricter standard of scrutiny
than the standard of "rational basis" scrutiny in allowing recovery
to the illegitimate for wrongful death.220 However, in Labine the
Court upheld the state's dual interest in protecting and strengthen-
ing family life and in providing for an orderly disposition of dece-
dent's estate over an illegitimate child's right of inheritance.22' The
Labine Court implies that the stricter standard of judicial review is
not always needed when there is no insurmountable barrier facing
the illegitimate.222 So too, in Lalli does the Court demonstrate its
reluctance to impose a stricter and fundamental standard of re-
view.223 In upholding the New York statute, the Court reiterated its
217. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in the unanimous decision of Pickett v.
Brown, has the latest word on the parameters the Court shall use in scrutinizing in statutory
classifications. Justice Brennan noted:
In view of the history of treating illegitimate children less favorably than legitimate
ones, we have subjected statutory classifications based on illegitimacy to a heightened
level of scrutiny. Although we have held that classifications based on illegitimacy are
not 'suspect' or subject to 'our most exacting scrutiny.'
Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2204, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372, 379 (1983).
218. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
219. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
220. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
221. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971).
222. See id at 537.
223. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266-71 (1978). The Lalli case suggests that the
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conclusions in Mathews and Trimble that "strict scrutiny" is not al-
224 Wways the standard of review. When Weber, Gomez, and finally
Mills eventually came before the Court, there was a return to a
stricter scrutiny over rights that seem no more fundamental than
those previously examined. Thus, there is no clear definition of fun-
damental rights which, when challenged by legitimate state inter-
ests, might consistently result in stricter scrutiny, at least a middle
level scrutiny, by the courts.
The current statutory framework is also uncertain and demands
future changes. Statutes broadly discriminate between legitimates
and illegitimates without being "carefully tuned to alternative con-
siderations. 2 25 These statutes exceed the purported state interest
thereby reducing the fundamental rights of children. Furthermore,
they prohibit the protection of natural children acknowledged by
the father but now barred by the statute from benefits. While this
listing of current statutory provisions is not conclusive, the statute
discussed in Krantz v. Harris22
6 is indicative.227
Furthermore, the statutes that seek to safeguard significant state
interests often result in just the opposite.228 For example, the state's
interest in adopting the one-year period of limitation for the illegiti-
combination of state interests in orderly disposition of property inheritance, and in the pre-
vention of fraudulent claims would substantially justify a discriminating statutory classifica-
tion scheme requiring that a filiation order be made as a prerequisite to illegitimate
inheritance. See id at 266-71.
224. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266-71 (1978); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
225. Cf. Green v. Woodward, 318 N.E.2d 397, 408 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (example of
intraclass discrimination against illegitimates).
226. 162 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1968).
227. See id. at 629 (illegitimate child barred from bringing wrongful death action when
father, engaged to be married to the child's mother, died before his birth). States which grant
absolute rights from the mother but condition inheritance rights from the father usually
require some type of acknowledgment or adjudication prescribed by statute. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 39-501 (1964) ("children" includes all illegitimates when applied to mother, and
additionally to father if father notoriously or in writing recognized paternity or if paternity
determined during father's lifetime in court action). While it is apparent that the statutes are
not uniform, some states will attempt to construe the statutes as liberally as possible. See
Jung v. St. Paul Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 27 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Minn. 1947) (statutes are
"remedial" and should be given liberal construction); Martin v. Claxton, 274 S.W. 77, 78-79
(Mo. 1925) (statutes are an abrogation of the common law and should be liberally con-
strued). When state statutes require a paternity adjudication prior to the putative father's
death or within some specified time period related to the birth of the illegitimate child,
children who would naturally benefit from the father are victimized.
228. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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mate to bring a paternity suit was a "desire to reduce the number of
individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls."22 9 In Mills, Justice
O'Connor recognized that this period of limitation would in fact
force illegitimates into a greater dependence on welfare. 230 Also, if
courts rely upon intestate statutes as "a general legitimating stat-
ute,"'23 ' there is a detrimental effect upon such important rights as
citizenship,232 support rights,233 and adoption proceedings. 234 Cases
such as Mathews v. Lucas235 and Trimble v. Gordon, 236 where the
Court did not exercise a strict standard of judicial review, also
demonstrate the fragile nature of illegitimate rights when they com-
pete with state interests in the area between strict scrutiny and mini-
mal rational basis scrutiny. Thus, state statutes and judicial scrutiny
of them combine to thwart a paramount state interest: decrease of
welfare recipients.
If the future is to hold promise for the illegitimate, an immediate
option would be for the Supreme Court to decide that illegitimates
are a suspect class and always entitled to strict scrutiny. Nonethe-
less, cases such as Trimble and Mathews suggest that state inter-
ests2 37 and state statutes will continue to be examined under the
fourteenth amendment in the middle ground between minimum ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny. The Pickett decision, decided imme-
229. See id at 103 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. See id at 104 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. See Allen v. Califano, 452 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978).
232. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1982).
233. See VA. CODE § 20-61.1 (1983).
234. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
235. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). Mathews began a series of cases up-
holding state limitations on the rights of illegitimates. In Mathews, the child did not qualify
for survivor benefits from the father. There was a state presumption that the child was not
dependent upon the father unless the child could prove: (1) father lived with child; (2)
father contributed to child's support at his death; (3) any of the statutory presumptions
which recognize dependency. See id at 507.
236. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Although there was a paternity order declaring the decedent
to be the father of an illegitimate daughter, the daughter was prevented from inheriting from
the father because the Illinois statute required intermarriage of the parents in addition to
acknowledgment of paternity. See id at 770. The Court did in fact find the statute unconsti-
tutional, but as in Mathews, it also found that the classifications of illegitimates did not
warrant strict scrutiny. See id at 768-74.
237. Perhaps the foremost state interest is providing for an orderly and just disposition
of a decedent's estate. Since we are making recommendations for the future, we should be
aware that as the American population grows older, this will not become less of a state
interest.
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diately prior to the publication of this article is evidence of how
narrow this middle ground has become. Cases such as Batchelor,
Gomez, Jimenez, and Mills suggest that the Court will narrow the
space between those two extremes of judicial scrutiny and decide in
favor of the illegitimate whenever the state statute seems arbitrary.
In addition to the Court's future responsiblity to protect funda-
mental rights of illegitimates, the state legislators have the present
responsibility to draft statutes that will protect such rights. Statutes
protecting an illegitimate's right to paternal support are already in
existence in a number of states. Many of these statutes, however,
limit a father's support obligation; time limitations have been estab-
fished for liability prior to the paternity suit238 and for bringing a
paternity suit.239 One onerous feature of these statutes is an arbitrary
time restriction. In Jimenez, the Court stated that the time restriction
must be reasonably related to the government interest.24 As to the
length of any statutory time, Justice O'Connor implies in Mills that
the right to establish paternity should exist throughout the illegiti-
mate child's minority for the safeguarding of the right to child
support. 241
The Uniform Probate Code242 [hereinafter UPC] provides some
guidance to state legislators in fulfilling their responsiblity to draft
statutes pertaining to the rights of the illegitimate. Specifically, sec-
tion 2-109 of the UPC seeks to discourage fraudulent claims under
intestate succession laws by providing for the parent/child relation-
238. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 273 (Supp. 1981) (father's obligation for
past education and support limited to six years prior to suit); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-11
(1973) (father's obligation for past education and support limited to one year prior to suit);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-3 (1977) (father's obligation for past education and support lim-
ited to four years prior to suit.).
239. See, e.g., State v. Maddox, 358 So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (two-year
statute of limitations held constitutional); Jensen v. Voshell, 193 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Iowa
1971) (proceeding to establish paternity must be brought within two years after birth of
illegitimate); Stringer v. Dudoich, 583 P.2d 462, 463 (N.M. 1978) (two-year statute of limita-
tions constitutional).
240. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974).
241. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 105-06 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1977). The Uniform Probate Code has now
been adopted in 14 states. They are:
[Vol. 15:79
19831 ILLEGITIMACY
ship.243 Also, through the use of the Uniform Parentage Act2 " the
illegitimate child becomes the intestate distributee if the father has
















Additionally, Kentucky has not adopted the Uniform Probate Code but has substantially
adopted article VII, part 1, which is the trust organization section.
243. See id The Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter UPC] promulgated by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was approved by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1969. Section 2-109 provides for the parent-
child relationship for intestate inheritance purposes as follows:
Section 2-109 (Meaning of Child and Related Terms).
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be
established to determine succession by, through, or from a person,
(1) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural par-
ents except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on
the relationship between the child and either natural parent.
(2) In cases not covered by Paragraph (1), a person is the child of its parents regard-
less of the marital status of its parents and the parent and child relationship may be
established under the [Uniform Parentage Act].
Alternative subsection (2) for states that have not adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act.
(2) In cases not covered by Paragraph (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child of
the mother. That person is also a child of the father, ifi
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth
of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or (ii) the paternity is estab-
lished by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by
clear and convincing proof, but the paternity established under this subparagraph is
ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child un-
less the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the
child.
Id
244. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9A U.L.A. 590, 591 (1979). Section 4 of the Uniform
Parentage Act provides for a presumption of paternity if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the
child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by
ST MAR JY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:79
clared paternity in a document filed with the appropriate court or
the Vital Statistics Bureau.245 States not adopting the Uniform Par-
entage Act would establish proof under the UPC by an "adjudica-
tion '246 prior to the death of the father or after the father's death at
any time, by clear and convincing proof. Under these UPC options,
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation is
entered by a court;
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to
marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law, al-
though the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and,
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the child is
born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its termination by
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is born
within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation;
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or at-
tempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with
law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity of the child in writing filed with the [appro-
priate court or Vital Statistics Bureau].
(ii) with his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's birth certifi-
cate, or
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by
the court order,
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing fied with the [appropriate
court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall promptly inform the mother of the filing of
the acknowledgment, and she does not dispute the acknowledgment within a reasonable
time after being informed thereof, in a writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital
Statistics Bureau]. If another man is presumed under this section to be the child's father,
acknowledgment may be effected only with the written consent of the presumed father
or after the presumption has been rebutted.
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action only
by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions arise which conflict with
each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considera-
tions of policy and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court decree estab-
lishing paternity of the child by another man.
Id
245. Id The presumption found in subsection 4 of the Uniform Parentage Act allows
for reasonable proof of paternity without an expensive and time consuming filiation pro-
ceeding of La/l
246. The UPC does not define adjudication. Conceivably, it could encompass mere
support orders or support agreements instead of the formal order of filiation which the Lalli
New York statutory inheritance scheme required. New York, although burdened with sec-
tion 4-1.2 of the Estates, Powers & Trusts Law, has itself recognized this trend. See In re
Anonymous, 302 N.Y.S.2d 688, 696 (Sur. Ct. 1969) (an inheritance by an illegitimate child
was based on support agreement which contained specific declaration of paternity). New
York followed this lead with In re Kennedy, 392 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Sur. Ct. 1977), in which
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there are no definite time restrictions terminating the right of the
illegitimate child to prove paternal relationship.247 Section 7 of the
Uniform Parentage Act, however, does limit an action by or on be-
half of a child whose paternity has not been determined, to three
years after the child reaches majority.248 This is an extended period
of time, yet protective of state interests and rights enunciated in
Trimble, Jimenez, Cahill, Gomez, Weber, and Mills.
The clear and convincing proof identified within the UPC should
also prompt states to give greater statutory recognition to gains
made by science in recent years. Paternity is and always has been, a
genetic fact. Since there were no certain means by which the genetic
fact of paternity could be determined in the past, statutes provided a
solution. Today, because this statutory solution is so frought with
inequality and because of the scientific advancements made in the
area of proving paternity,249 there is sufficient justification for the
proposition that legislatures should utilize advanced technology in
drafting state statutes.250 At a minimum, and until such time as the
chemist provides certainty, statutes should consistently be reviewed
under at least a middle level scrutiny.
A broader level of inquiry invites another option for the future:
the use of a referee to facilitate the processing of claims affecting
substantial state interests and fundamental personal rights.25' Mills
suggests that in the advent of science and technological advance-
ment, as well as greater judicial scrutiny, evidentiary problems of
false paternity claims will cease to justify any facile statutory denial
of substantive rights to illegitimates.252 Nonetheless, as Mills sought
a support order not specifically declaring paternity was held tantamount to a ftihation order,
and the illegitimate child was allowed the inheritance.
247. This seems consistent with Justice O'Connor's suggestion in her concurring opin-
ion in the Mill's case. In this matter the UPC avoided discriminating against the illegitimate
children after the father's death and/or those who, due to one unfortunate circumstance or
another, may not have brought the paternity suit during the father's life.
248. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 7, 9A U.L.A. 596 (1979).
249. See Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause, JointIAMA-ABA Guidelines: Present
Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258 (1976).
250. State legislators should be mindful of the fact that advanced technology can be
costly and thus beyond the reach of the majority of those concerned with proof of paternity.
A method to address this cost factor must be a part of any effective and fair statute.
251. The use of a referee in varied types of factual determinations is not new to the law;
it is certainly no stranger to paternity and illegitimacy. See Howells v. McKibben, 281
N.W.2d 154, 155 (Minn. 1979); Bassi v. Zappaterra, 234 Cal. App. 2d 529 (1965).
252. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-98 n.4 (1982).
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to improve upon Gomez, so will other cases, equally costly and rep-
resenting an insignificant segment of the illegitimate population,
continue to be heard. The burdened judicial system should be
spared this. In its efforts to be "carefully tuned to alternative consid-
erations," the state legislatures should seek the use of a referee to
examine the factual basis for legitimation within the time suggested
by the Uniform Probate Code, an effective and economical resource.
Needed change will be slow to come in the future. Historical im-
pediments to the rights of illegitimates remain from the French civil
law, the English common law, and the theory that courts were not
empowered to grant inheritance rights.253 Under this theory, only
legislatures were empowered to grant inheritance rights and unfor-
tunately, the legislatures have been slow to change.
Change will also be slow because state interests are continuously
asserted successfully by the state to justify the classification of ille-
gitimacy.254 In the future, state concern over speed of administra-
tion, elimination of fraud, and certainty of distributees will only
increase. Any legislative substitution in the future for the present
illegitimate statutes will need to address these same issues with a
view towards providing a better system, a system able to withstand
any degree of equal protection scrutiny.255
Proponents of change should recognize the weaknesses of the
present system. The fact that in Texas, cases such as Bell and Maris-
cal can have similar facts, yet different results,256 points to the pres-
ent uncertainty in the law. This uncertainty increases when courts
such as the Batchelor court sustain a "case by case determination"
253. See Moorman v. Moorman, 66 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Mich. 1954) (the judiciary has no
control over legislature's judgment concerning descent and distribution laws).
254. Traditional state interests in regard to illegitimacy concern such issues as are re-
cited in Green v. Woodward, 318 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974):
In the past, illegitimate children were treated as 'nothing' and reasons given for such
discrimination were to: (1) preserve feudal tenure; (2) discourage illegitimate relation-
ships; (3) avoid artificial presumptions of intent; (4) encourage legitimate family rela-
tionships; (5) protect the rights of legitimate children.
Id. at 400.
255. See Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 504-05
(1967).
256. Compare Bell v. Hinkle, 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980) (issue of paternity question of law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981) with John-
son v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981) (factual deter-
mination of paternity), writ reid nr.e. per curiam, 626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
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of paternity issues.257 A "case by case determination" also requires
further defining of "fundamental rights." This is costly, often arbi-
trary, and invites Supreme Court interpretation of statutes and cases
like Batchelor.258
The use of a referee is certainly less costly, more likely to result in
the utilization of technology, and because of the local character of a
referee, better suited to assist minority populations historically af-
fected by discriminatory actions.259 In a fact pattern like that of Bell
and Mariscal, the use of a referee would be an alternative to the
often arbitrary constraints of law26° and the vagaries of a jury's de-
termination 26' as to what constitutes recognition. The future will de-
termine whether utilizing a referee would be a better approach than
the Supreme Court reviewing decisions like Batchelor; this state of
uncertainty points again to the lack of solidity of existing statutory
procedure.262
There is a present likelihood of fraudulent paternity claims im-
plicit in any system likely to sustain judicial scrutiny. Past statutory
classifications, both valid and invalid under the fourteenth amend-
ment, all invited fraudulent claims. 263 As long as the referee is
257. See Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982,
writ refd n.r.e.).
258. A review of the Mills decision will demonstrate the concern of the Supreme Court
with repeated intrusions into Texas statutory law. A more creative response to Gomez would
have prevented Mills.
259. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the U.S., (1967).
260. Cf Bell v. Hinkle, 607 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.)
1980) (question of whether or not person was biological offspring of a male is question of
law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
261. Cf. Johnson v. Mariscal, 620 S.W.2d 905, 909 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
198 1)(recognition by father requires factual determination), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 626
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1982).
262. Remember that in Gomez the Supreme Court ruled invalid in a per curiam opin-
ion a Texas statute saying an illegitimate had no judicially enforceable right to financial
support from the father. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). The
Court cited Weber as the standard for review and this standard was a stricter one that was
particularly sensitive to race, lineage, and status of birth. See id at 538. From among a
statutory classification, a jury, and a referee, it is arguable that a referee better responds to
these sensitive issues.
263. See Tenny v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 224, 225 (E.D. Mo. 1977). The Civil
Service Retirement System Act contained a "lived with" requirement that was to bar pay-
ments to illegitimate children who did not live with the deceased annuitant. The court said
the exclusion of illegitimates did not promote the purpose, nor did it discourage spurious
claims of parentage. See id at 228.
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guided by the Uniform Parentage Act264 or the clear and convincing
proof of the Uniform Probate Code,265 who is to say if the prior
statutory solution prevented fraud any more effectively?
Through the Mills decision, Justice O'Connor and the four other
justices who joined in most of her opinion, adopted a policy of real-
ism in response to the increasing number of illegitimates.266 The
Court today, as evidenced by Pickett v. Brown, 267 is mindful of the
advances in technology, the burden upon state welfare rolls, the
avoidance of responsibility by putative fathers, and the changing
mores within which Americans live and die today. The Court's un-
willingness to apply a strict standard of judicial scrutiny is under-
standable. As the Justices move toward a middle approach,
however, the states should respond. A renewed effort on the part of
state legislatures to the challenge of illegitimacy is certainly the
greatest implication for the future.
V. CONCLUSION
It is evident that state legislatures are the traditional guardians of
interests affecting the people they govern. Among these interests are:
protection of family life, stability of title and ownership of property,
speed and efficiency in administering a decedent's estate, prevention
of fraudulent claims, and all this, as cheaply as possible. Nonethe-
less, changes within the population itself demand that yesterday's
solutions no longer correspond to today's desire for justice for a
class of persons as illegitimates. The 1982 case of Mills v. Habluetzel
is a benchmark in this process.
Life patterns among today's adults, many of them members of
minority populations, cannot be cast into evidentiary classifications
seeking to satisfy state interests. Also, the future of state legislation
cannot be couched in a win-lose terminology; neither may
thousands of children be stigmatized with standards of morality.
Today, state legislatures must look to the facts and draft inquiries
264. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 7, 9A U.L.A. 596 (1979).
265. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2) (1979).
266. If this premise is correct, then a majority of the Court would now favor the Maris-
eal approach that requires a court to look to the facts, not a statutory approach as we saw in
Batchelor.
267. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983).
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that will allow sensitive, modem, and practical protection to the
fundamental personal rights of illegitimates.
Substantial state interests are not an issue, only the means by
which they are safeguarded. Suggestions of greater judicial scru-
tiny, utilization of statutory approaches such as the uniform acts, or
equity devices such as a referee, all are meant to safeguard state
interests. Nonetheless, after Mills, greater protection has come to
mean more. Greater protection is now a right to which the illegiti-
mate is entitled.

